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ABSTRACT 
This study uses a dynamic panel data method to examine the sensitivity of non-performing        
  loans (NPLs) and bank capital buffer (BCB) to macroeconomic variables. This approach is       
motivated by the hypothesis that says macroeconomic variables have an effect on the bank’s      
balance sheet, and this effect varies across developed and emerging economies. 
 
The results show that NPLs are sensitive to GDP growth, interest rate, public debt, sovereign   
debt and unemployment in developed economies. However, NPLs are sensitive to GDP                    
growth, exchange rate, interest rate, sovereign debt, unemployment and volume of imports in   
emerging economies. Public debt is not statistically significant in explaining the sensitivity            
of NPLs in emerging economies. Similarly, exchange rate and volume of imports have no             
significant influence on NPLs in developed economies. 
 
In relation to the BCB we find GDP growth, exchange rate, interest rate, sovereign debt,                 
unemployment and volume of imports as significant macroeconomic variables driving the           
sensitivity of capital buffer in emerging economies. Conversely, interest rate, sovereign debt     
and unemployment are macroeconomic variables responsible for the sensitivity of the buffer      
in developed economies. GDP growth, exchange rate and volume of   imports have no                           
significant influence. 
Considering the liquidity risk imposed to the banks’ balance sheet by this set of                                  
macroeconomic variables. It seems plausible that their dynamics should be given attention         
when conceiving any policy mix to cope with credit expansion. Without such exercise, the               
goal of financial stability in the global banking system will be difficult to achieve. 
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CHAPTER 1 
  
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This study investigates the relationships between bank credit risk indicators and                              
macroeconomic variables in developed and emerging economies. As highlighted by Stolz & 
Widow (2011), the deterioration in banks performance after the 2008 global financial crisis        
has unveiled some unknown economic factors. Building from this understanding, our study       
analyses the aggregate levels of bank capital buffer (BCB) and non-performing loans (NPLs) 
across the global banking system. The macroeconomic knowledge that informs the                           
sensitivity of these two credit risk indicators is indispensable. Such knowledge presents the                
macroeconomic mechanisms of achieving global financial stability (Bolt et al., 2012). 
 
Most empirical papers mainly from developed economies have emerged. These papers link         
increases in non-performing loans (NPLs) to macroeconomic environment (Louzis et al., 2012 
and Bolt et al., 2012). Other studies explore the formation of bank capital buffer (BCB) at 
different business cycles (Coffinet et al., 2012; and Gauthier et al., 2012). In both instances, the 
literature agrees that the upswing in NPLs and the depletion of BCB affect credit supply and 
induce macro financial vulnerabilities. However, Nkusu, (2011) and Benes & Kumho, (2015) 
argue that the extent to which macroeconomic variables are   responsible for these changes is 
not yet fully understood. 
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Limited work has been done to compare the macroeconomic interactions with the credit risk    
indicators across economies. This thesis seeks to address this gap.  We decided to model the      
impact of the following macroeconomic variables: (GDP growth, volume of exports, volume 
of imports, exchange rate, public debt, sovereign debt, unemployment and real interest rate)       
to bank credit risk indicators proxied by BCB and NPLs.These macroeconomic variables are   
selected based on their significant influence to the global economy (Dabrowsk et al., 2005).     
Therefore, by capturing their dynamic influences to credit risk indicators, we contributes                        
positively in pushing the streams of this literature with realistic economic insight arising from               
macroeconomic performance.  
 
 
1.2 AIM OF THE STUDY  
 
Our aim is to assess the extent of differences in the sensitivity of BCB and NPLs to                           
macroeconomic variables. At the same time, we seek to identify possible (dis)similarities in       
the macroeconomic interaction with bank credit risk indicators between the two broad                    
economies. Panel studies directed in this approach have been scarcely conducted as noted in      
the main stream journals. Most papers that constitute the current body of knowledge are               
mainly isolated and individual country-focused. (Glen & Velez, 2011 and Gauthier et al.,                  
2012).Moreover, these papers have analysed mainly the NPLs but not both indicators                     
concurrently. The current study is innovative in a sense that it combines both indicators (BCB 
and NPLs) to explain their sensitivity to macroeconomic variables. Against this background,   
we are embracing a deeper investigation using a dual analysis approach. 
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1.3  OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
 
 
There is no standardized objective approach to analyze the factors that influences bank 
credit risk indicators in the literature. Data availability presents a major challenge that 
constrains the methodological options (Louzis et al., 2012). In our underlying 
macroeconomic framework, we have followed the recent models and adopted an integrated 
panel approach. This approach uses a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to quantify 
the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables annually . This procedure allows us to study 
the gradual long term shifts in bank credit risk indicators across the two broad economies. 
In addition to that, the GMM estimation takes all necessary precautions of controlling 
possible biasness arising from endogeneity of explanatory variables. This delivers robust 
results which are acceptable in the literature (Louzis et al., 2012). 
 
 
1.4 HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY  
 
 
The current results are naturally expected to have not been documented before especial in 
the context of emerging economies. This makes it difficult to hypothesize the possible 
outcome of the study. For example, empirical evidence is provided to show that the 
relationship between exchange rates and NPLs is unknown in both advanced and emerging 
economies (Nkusu 2011). Equally unknown, is also the relationship between BCB to 
general macroeconomic variables across economies (Gauthier et al., 2012).In modeling 
these unknown factors, we contribute positively in pushing the streams of the literature a 
step further. 
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In addition to these unknown factors, our investigation also reviews the consistency of some 
documented relationships. The current study expects GDP growth and public debt (PUD) 
to negatively relate with NPLs (Festic et al., 2011). Also, we expect unemployment rates 
(UNR) to positively relate with NPLs (Berge & Boye 2007). The relationships between 
these macroeconomic variables (GDP, PUD and UNR) and NPLs are well documented in 
the literature from advanced economies (Festic et al., 2011; Nkusu, 2011 and Sirtaine & 
Skamnelos 2007).Therefore, the current paper expect the consistency of these relationships 
to prevail once again in our investigation. 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
 
 
The significance of this study stems from the comprehensive coverage of less studied emerging 
economies. The current analysis identifies possible (dis)similarities in the macroeconomic 
interaction with credit risk indicators between the two broad economies. As recommended by 
Bolt et al., (2012) and Nkusu, (2011), such enquiry is significant in helping emerging economies 
to uncover macrofinancial vulnerabilities that are associated with their banks. From our 
analysis, we are addressing this recommendation and present the dynamic differences in 
systematic risk of the two broad economies. This comprehends the basic strategies needed to 
avert global financial instabilities . Certainly, the assessment of this magnitude is of benefit to 
the regulatory authorities and managers of the vast financial institutions.  
 
The thesis proceeds as follows: chapter two gives an overview of the literature focusing on BCB 
and NPLs. chapter three outlines the methodology. Chapter four details the empirical analysis 
and the description of the data. Chapter five includes the estimated results.  Chapter six 
discusses the results and the last section concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The aftermath of the recent global financial meltdown highlighted  the importance of macro-
financial linkages and the role played by the banking sector in financial markets (Bolt et al., 
2012).  The Basel Accord was established in 1988 (Basel I), the aim was to build a safety net 
for banks against business cycle fluctuations and market risks by assuring that banks would 
hold adequate levels of capital. The banking sectors of countries incorporated into the Basel I 
Accord were required to hold at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets (RWA) in capital. Basel 
I was replaced by Basel II in 2004 to ensure that minimum capital requirements were more 
closely linked to banks’ risk profiles and supervisory interventions were implied in case of bank 
failures (Basel 2011). 
Capital buffers are capital holdings of banks that exceed the regulatory minimum. The 
incentives for banks to hold capital in excess of the required minimum are many: to avoid costly 
intervention during economic down turn, to signal financial soundness to the market, to take 
advantage of profitable market opportunities and to create a cushion against recessions which 
bring  increases in the non-performing loans (NPLs) ( Borio & Zhu, 2012).. When banks fail to 
accumulate capital buffers in times of economic booms, they could be trapped with insufficient 
level of capital during an economic downturn. Under these circumstances banks are forced to 
reduce their lending practice  to the market in order to meet the regulatory minimum capital 
requirements . Since it is costlier to raise capital through new equities during economic 
slowdown . Hence, the cyclical behavior of capital buffers amplifies the impact of shocks on 
economic stability through reduced lending . 
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Aiming to prevent these destabilizing cyclical impacts of capital buffers fluctuations, Basel III 
requires banks to increase capital buffers during economic booms through a “mandatory capital 
conservation buffer” of 2.5% and through a “discretionary counter-cyclical buffer” of up to 
another 2.5% in times of credit booms ( figure 1). Ayuso & Saurina (2004) further show that 
capital requirements should be varying over the cycle by deriving the capital requirements of 
Basel II for each unit of loan for Spanish Banks over the period 1987–2007 to estimate 
probabilities of default. Hence, considering the impact of Basel Accords on economic stability 
through capital requirements, it is crucial to assess the cyclical behavior of capital buffers for a 
successful implementation of Basel III. 
Regarding the cyclical behavior of capital buffers, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
Ayuso & Saurina (2004), Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) find evidence in favor of counter-
cyclical fluctuation of capital buffers in advanced economies. On the other hand, Jokipii  & 
Milne (2009) study commercial, savings, and co-operative banks separately, as well as small 
and large banks, and find that the capital buffers of different banks exhibit different cyclical 
behaviors. Their results show that the capital buffers of commercial, savings, and large banks 
fluctuate counter-cyclically, while those of co-operative and smaller banks fluctuate pro-
cyclically. Fonseca & Gonzalez (2010) find differentiated patterns in the levels of capital buffer 
holdings across and within developed and developing countries. 
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By the beginning of the 2000s, when most of the banking systems adopted for  Basel I standards, 
the impact of these standards on the cyclical behavior of capital buffer became the center of 
attention in the literature. Questions were raised regarding the cyclical effects of Basel Accord.  
Flannery  & Rangan (2008.) examine the economic effects of Basel I in the banking systems of 
the region. Although they find evidence of increased lending activity and capitalization after its 
implementation, they also find that growth in lending is more sensitive to changes in banks’ 
capital ratios. Consequently, the authors expected lending growth to become more pro-cyclical 
after Basel II implementation as capital ratios under the Accord were expected to reflect risk 
factors that vary with the cycle. 
Numerous countries were expected to adapt Basel II progressively after the agreed date for 
implementing the second Accord in 2007. Many policy analysts and economists declared their 
concerns over the effects of Basel II on the competitive landscape of the region before the initial 
date of adaption. De Nicolo et al.,(2003) claim that the multiple options for regulatory capital 
determination contained in the proposal would create regulatory divergence in the region due 
to the different levels of market penetration, standardized approaches adopted by credit rating 
institutions and internal risk systems.  
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However, the global financial crisis in 2008 postponed the adoption of the second Accord in 
most emerging economies . According to a Financial Stability Institute questionnaire sent to 
the region's supervisory authorities in 2004, eleven out of the 15 major economies in the region 
had plans to adapt Basel II over the period 2007–2009 (Beatty & Liao,  2011). However, 
according to the World Bank global Survey Banking Regulation in 2012, only Brazil, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay, Costa Rica, South Africa  and Cayman Islands had fully implemented Basel II 
in 2011. The majority of  developing countries declared Basel I to be the regulatory standard in 
place.  
Currently, plans for the full implementation of Basel III are underway to all member states of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the G-20.Other countries such as Uruguay 
and Colombia have been modifying their regulatory chapters to incorporate elements of Basel 
III, whereas the rest of the region shows reform delay. Hence, because of the timing of 
implementation and of the drastic regulatory reformulation after the crisis, the current state of 
banking regulation in the world is characterized by non-convergent, with some countries  caught 
in the middle of incomplete implementation of both Basel II and III.     
 
 It should be noted  nevertheless that the formal adoption of Basel III does not seem to pose a 
disproportionate challenge for developing countries. Espinoza & Prasad, (2010) examine the 
initial conditions for the implementation of Basel III in Andean countries, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru. They find that these countries would have little difficulty adapting their 
banking systems to the new standards of Basel III, and would even be reducing their current 
level of regulatory capital.  
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However, little attention has been paid to conditions of the developing  countries banks and to 
the implications of the new philosophy and measures proposed by Basel III. The constitution 
of counter cyclical capital buffers is a central element of the new regulatory package. As capital 
ratios under Basel I and II were designed to reflect underlying risks in bank's portfolios more 
closely, and given the cyclical nature of those risks, the frameworks proposed by the first two 
versions of the Accord might have contributed to procyclical behavior over business cycles 
since their global implementation. 
 
The main objective of this literature  review is to assess the cyclical patterns of capital buffers 
in a panel of banks from developed and emerging economies . The contribution of our  thesis 
to the  literature is to provide new information on the behavior of capital buffers using data 
from emerging markets and developed countries. There are a limited number of studies on this 
issue in the literature. Previous research has mostly focused on developed countries’ banking 
sectors. A few studies use single country data to investigate the behavior of capital buffers for 
emerging markets.  
 
To our knowledge, this is the first analysis on the topic that uses cross country data from an 
emerging market region. Examining the cyclical behavior of capital buffers for the banking 
markets of developing countries contributes to the literature. Hence, this study would allow the 
comparison of results for emerging economies with those of developed economies. Moreover, 
empirical results of this study would provide valuable inputs for both regulators and researchers. 
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on banking credit risk uses either macroeconomic variables, or bank specific 
variables or both variables in explaining NPLs. Berger & De Young, (1997) have combined 
both macroeconomic and bank specific variables to explain aggregate NPLs. According to their 
paper, bank specific variable proxied by efficiency ratios serves as early warning indicators for 
future changes in NPLs. Other similar studies include Clair (1992) and Louzis et al., (2012). 
However, Salas & Saurina (2002) report the lagged efficiency variables as statistically 
insignificant in explaining NPLs. According to their findings, NPLs are statistically negatively 
affected by solvency ratios. Based on these inconsistencies, more cross sectional studies are 
still needed to validate the robustness of this branch of literature. 
 
 
Most papers from advanced economies examine the influence of the macroeconomic 
environment on NPLs. Rinaldi & Sanchis-Arellano, (2006) analyse NPLs in a panel of 
European countries. This paper provide empirical evidence showing that disposable income, 
unemployment and monetary conditions have a strong impact on NPLs. Berge & Boye, (2007) 
report that NPLs are highly sensitive to the real interest rates and unemployment for the Nordic 
banking system over the period 1993–2005. Other studies focusing on the macroeconomic 
determinants of NPLs include Cifter et al., (2009) and Segoviano et al., (2006). Again, a sharp 
increase in NPLs is associated with the weakening of macroeconomic performance. 
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Espinoza & Prasad, (2010) uses a sample of 80 banks of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
region and reports that NPL ratio worsens when economic growth weakens and interest rates 
increase. In their paper, the effect of increases in NPLs suggests that there is a strong link 
between adverse losses in banks’ balance sheets and low economic activity. Louzis et al., (2012) 
conduct similar analysis and further links sovereign debt (SOD) to NPLs. According to their 
analysis, banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises. 
 
In this context, banks become reluctant to lend thus compromises investors and debtor’s ability 
to refinance their debts. Moreover, a rise in public debt leads to fiscal measures, especially cuts 
in social expenditure and the wage component of government consumption (De Nicolo et al., 
2003).This situation renders unserviceable number of outstanding loans, as household’s income 
experience a negative shock. Louzis et al., (2012) draws the conclusion that a rise in sovereign 
debt (SOD) leads to increases in NPLs. 
 
Overall, this branch of literature concludes that a rise in gross domestic growth (GDP) and 
public debt (PUD) is negatively associated with NPLs (Festic el al. 2011 and Gauthier et al. 
2012). In explaining this relationship, the literature shows that GPD growth most often entails 
positive employment prospect and reduced financial distress. Based on this scenario an inverse 
relationship should always hold. Unemployment (UNR) an indicator of economic downturn is 
positively related with NPLs (Festic el al., 2011 and Sirtaine & Skamnelos, 2007). Lastly, 
lending rate (RLR) hike is also positively related with NPLs (Calvo & Mendoza, 2000; 
Barseghyan, 2010 and Nkusu, 2011). 
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Fofack, (2005) argues that exchange rates fluctuations have mixed implications to the volume 
of exports and imports. On one hand, it weakens the competitiveness of export-oriented firms 
and adversely affects their ability to service their debt. On the other, it improves the debt-
servicing capacity of borrowers who borrow in foreign currency. The sign of the relationship 
between exchange rates (EXR), volume of imports (IMP), volume of exports (EXP01) and 
NPLs is unknown ( Gauthier et al., 2012 and Nkusi , 2011). 
 
Although the current literature on banking credit risk does explains the macroeconomic 
variables that are associated with increases in NPLs, another branch of literature is equally 
important in highlighting the financial health of banks (Gauthier, Lehar and Souiss, 2012; Suaza 
et al., 2012). This branch of literature focuses on understanding the fluctuations of bank capital 
buffer (BCB) at different business cycles. Bank capital buffer is defined as the excess capital 
maintained by financial institutions at a given point in time. Banks hold different levels of 
capital depending on the individual characteristic of the bank and the business cycle (Suaza et 
al. 2012). 
 
The dependence of capital buffers on the business cycle has a negative impact on 
macroeconomic stability (Borio & Zhu 2012). Empirical studies shows that bank capital buffers 
of Western European banks fluctuates countercyclical over the business cycle (Ayuso & 
Saurina, 2004;  and Stolz & Wedow 2011).The argument is that banks undertake a riskier 
behavior during times of economic growth, expanding their loan portfolio without building up 
their capital buffers accordingly (Coffinet et al., 2012). 
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In economic downturn, when banks observe the realization of credit risk, those poorly 
capitalized face the possibility of falling below the minimum required levels (Borio & Zhu, 
2012 and Coffinet et al., 2012). Therefore, they have to either issue new equity or increase their 
capital buffers through reducing lending. Given that raising capital is too difficult during 
economic slowdown, many banks resort in cutting lending in a significant proportion (Coffinet 
et al., 2012 ). The resulting reduction in loanable funds experienced by firms and households 
fuels the magnitude of the economic downturn and contributes significantly in increases in 
NPLs (Stolz & Wedow 2011). 
 
In principle, banks may have private incentives to institute capital buffers (Coffinet et al., 2012; 
Berger & Boye,  2008, and Flannery & Rangan, 2008). However, the debated question is 
whether these capital buffers are built in a pro-cyclical way, meaning that the capital buffer 
should decrease during good economic times and increase in bad ones. If so, they would not be 
able to fuel the risks of credit restrictions, thus contributing to worsening output fluctuations 
(Coffinet et al., 2012). The existing literature is much divided. For example, Bikker & 
Metzemakers, (2005) report a weak relationship between BCB and the business cycle. 
 
However, Jokipii & Milne, (2009) argue a positive relationship in European Union accession 
countries. Fonseca & Gonzáles, (2010) report a non-significant effect of the business cycle on 
BCB across 59 out of 71 countries, while negative for seven of them and positive for five others. 
Based on this mixed economic literature, it is difficult to project precisely the sensitivity BCB 
to macroeconomic variables. In general, there is a deficit in understanding the macroeconomic 
variables responsible for the sensitivity of BCB. A census of empirical papers is yet to be 
discovered.  
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The work on the interaction between prudential regulation, macroeconomic variables and BCB 
is still rather limited (Borio & Zhu, 2012). Despite some welcome progress in recent years, the 
literature that analyses the implications of the sensitivity of BCB and NPLs to macroeconomic 
variables across economies is scarce (Angelina et al.,2003; and Suaza et al.,2012). Our study 
fulfills this task and assesses the extent of differences in the sensitivity of NPLs and BCB. This 
assessment will inform the banks and regulatory authorities of the imbedded risks inherited 
from macroeconomic performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This study adopted a dynamic panel approach as embraced in recent panel studies (Salas & 
Saurina, 2002 and Louzis et al., 2012). This dynamic panel data specification is generally given 
by: 
 
Yit = ɑ Yit-1 + β (L) Xit + ɳi + ᶓit , ׀ɑ׀ ˂1, I = 1,…..N, t = 1,…,T,                                                       (1) 
 
The subscripts i and t denote the cross sectional and time dimensions of the panel sample 
respectively. Yit  represents the aggregate NPLs or BCB, β(L) represents the 1 x k lag 
polynomial vector, Xit denote the k x1 vector of explanatory variables other than Yit-1, ɳi 
represent the unobserved individual bank specific effects and lastly ᶓit represents the error term. 
The study adopted the estimation of equation (1) using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The GMM estimation of Arellano and Bond 
is based on the transformation of equation (1) and the subsequent elimination of bank specific 
effects, giving rise to equation 2: 
 
ΔYit = ɑΔYit-1 + β(L) ΔXit + Δ ᶓ it ,                                                                                                           (2) 
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In equation 2, ΔYit denotes the first difference operator; ΔYit-1 represents the lagged depended 
variable and Δᶓit, represents the error term. According to Louzis et al., (2012), ΔYit-1 is 
constructed to correlate with the error term thereby imposing biasness in the estimation of the 
model. Nevertheless, ΔYit-2, which is expected to be correlated with ΔYit-1 and not correlated 
with Δ ᶓ it for t = 3,. . . ,T, can be used as an instrument in the estimation of equation (2). This 
suggests that lags of order two and more of the dependent variables satisfy the following 
condition (Louzis et al., 2012): 
 
E [Xit ᶓ it] = 0 t = 3,…, T and S ≥ 2.                                                                                             (3) 
 
A second source of biasness from the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables has 
been highlighted by Stolz & Merkl, (2011). This is suggested to result in correlation with the 
error term. In the case of strictly exogenous variables, all past and future values of the 
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error term, implying the following moment 
conditions: 
 
E [Xit ᶓ it] = 0 t = 3,…, T and for all S                                                                                           (4) 
 
This assumption of strict exogeneity is described by Louzis et al., (2012) as restrictive and 
invalid in the presence of reverse causality when E [Xit ᶓ it] ≠0 for t < s. The argument is that 
for the predetermined set of explanatory variables only current and lagged values of Xit are 
valid instruments .Then the following moment condition should be adopted (Louzis et al., 
2012): 
 
E [Xit ᶓ it] = 0 t = 3,…, T and for s ≥ 2                                                                                         (5) 
17 
 
 
The restrictions described in equation (3) – (5) provide the basics of the GMM estimation noted 
in the literature (Salas & Saurina, 2002 and Stolz & Merkl, 2011). In addition, Louzis et al., 
(2012) provides information about testing the overall validity of the results by implementing 
the Sargan specification test, which under the null hypothesis is asymptotically distributed as 
Chi- square (Arellano & Bond, 1991). This study adopted the recommendation by Louzis et al., 
(2012). All our results are reported with Sargan specification test. 
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3.2 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
Equation (1) takes the following form in the baseline model: 
ΔBCBit = ɑΔBCBit-1+β1jΔGDPt-j +β2jΔUNRt-j + β3jΔRLRt-j + β4jΔIMPt-j + β5jΔSODt-j 
+β6jΔPUDt-j +β7jΔEXP01t-j+β8jΔEXRt-j + ᶓ it                                                                         (6) 
 
ΔNPLit = ɑΔNPLit-1+β1jΔGDPt-j + β2jΔUNRt-j + β3jΔEXRt-j + β4jΔRLRt-j + β5jΔIMPt-j 
+β6jΔSODt-j + β7jΔEXP01t-j +β8jΔPUDt-j + ᶓ it                                                                          (7) 
 
With ׀ɑ׀˂1, i = 1,………………………….., 45 and t = 1,………………………………, 11. 
 
 
In both equation 6 and 7, ΔNPLit-1 is the first lag of the aggregate non-performing loans, while 
ΔBCBit-1 denote the first lag of the aggregate bank capital buffer.ΔGDPt is the percentage 
change in gross domestic product, ΔUNRt is the percentage change in the unemployment rates, 
ΔRLRt is the percentage change in the lending rates, ΔEXRt is the percentage change in 
exchange rates, ΔIMPt is the percentage change in volume of imports, ΔEXP0t is the percentage 
change in volume of exports, ΔPUDt represents a percentage change in public debt while ΔSODt 
represents percentage changes in sovereign debt. 
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As reported in the literature, a rise in real gross domestic growth (GDP) and public debt (PUD) 
is expected to negatively relate with NPLs (Festic el al., 2011 and Gauthier et al., 2012). 
Unemployment (UNR) is expected to relate positively with NPLs (Festic el al., 2011 and 
Sirtaine & Skamnelos 2007).Lending rate (RLR) hike is equally expected to positively relate 
with NPLs (Calvo & Mendoza 2000; Barseghyan 2010 & Nkusu 2011). Lastly, sovereign debt 
(SOD) is also expected to positively related with NPLs (Louzis et al., 2012).The sign of the 
relationship between exchange rates (EXR), volume of imports (IMP), volume of exports 
(EXP01) and NPLs is unknown (Gauthier et al., 2012 and Nkusi 2011). Equally unknown, is 
also the interactions between these selected macroeconomic variables and BCB (Borio & Zhu, 
2012). Based on this limitation, it is difficult to project precisely the sensitivity BCB to these 
macroeconomic variables. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.1 EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 DATA SET 
The current study employs a balanced panel sample consisting of supervisory data from 21 
advanced countries and 24 emerging countries spanning from 2000 to 2011. Macroeconomic 
variables for each country are retracted from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. Data 
for aggregate NPLs and aggregate BCB per country is obtained from Bank scope and World 
Bank Global Financial Indicators Database. The study analyzed separately the advanced and 
emerging countries using an econometrics software package E-views version 12, so to identify 
possible (dis)similarities in the interaction of the macroeconomic variables and the credit risk 
indicators. Table 4.1.1  shows the list of countries analyzed in our investigation. 
 
Table 4. 1.1.Sample of countries analysed in our investigation. 
Developed Economies 
                                            
 
 
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada,Denmark,Finland,Germany,Iceland,Ireland,Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States         
of America. 
Emerging Economies 
                                            
 
 
Argentina,Bosnia,Brazil,Chile,China,Colombia,Egypt,Estonia,Hungary,India,Indonesia,         
Kenya,Mexico,Nigeria,Paraguay,Philippine,Poland,Russia,Singapore,Slovak,SouthAfrica,      
Thailand and Turkey. 
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The study started its empirical analysis by examining the descriptive statistics in both 
economies. Table 4.1.2 presents the descriptive statistics of advanced economies, while table 
4.1.3 presents the same statistics in a context of emerging economies. The advanced economies 
shows low average levels of BCB and NPLs compared to their emerging counterparts. 
Furthermore, the BCB and NPLs of advanced economies are more volatile presenting high 
positive skewness and excess kurtosis compared to emerging economies. This is attributed to 
the level of economic activity these banks are subjected too (Lipschitz, 2011 and Kodongo & 
Ojah, 2012). As expected from the literature, banks in advanced economies are more efficient 
and are more involve in taking risks to finance the larger share of global economy. This explains 
the higher volatility and skewness compared to their emerging counterparts (Lipschitz, 2011).  
 
Table 4.1.2.Descriptive statistics for NPLs and BCB in developed economies. 
                                            NPLs                                                BCB 
 
Mean                                    3.08                                                6.02 
Median                                 1.80                                                5.70 
Maximum                            42.20                                              14.40           
Minimum                             0.20                                                2.70 
Std Dev                                5.12                                                3.80 
Skewness                             5.93                                                1.35 
Kurtosis                               5.78                                                5.95 
JB test                                  125.6                                             114.08 
p-Value                                (0.00)                                             (0.00) 
Note: JB denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test .The p-Values of the JB test are shown in brackets. 
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Table 4.1.3.Descriptive statistics for NPLs and BCB in emerging economies. 
                                            NPLs                                                BCB 
 
Mean                                    8.25                                                 9.68 
Median                                 5.25                                                 9.60 
Maximum                            34.90                                               20.10           
Minimum                             0.20                                                 2.12 
Std Dev                                4.69                                                 3.13 
Skewness                             1.46                                                 0.32 
Kurtosis                               4.46                                                 2.98 
JB test                                  118.1                                               104.5 
p-Value                                (0.00)                                              (0.01) 
Note: JB denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test .The p-Values of the JB test are shown in brackets. 
 
 
The second part of the empirical analysis investigates the sensitivity of NPLs to GDP 
fluctuations. Figure 1 shows sensitivity trends of NPLs to GDP growth for United States of 
America (USA) and Spain (SPA), while Figure 2 shows similar trends using two emerging 
countries Russia (RUS) and Hungary (HUN).Following the 2008 banking crises, studies have 
debated a sensible marker for the onset of the banking crisis . This debate emanates from the 
collapse of some banks despite having maintained the minimum requirements recommended 
by the Basil I  ( Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005 ). 
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Reinhart & Rogoff, (2010) advocates for NPLs to be used as a sensible marker for the onset of 
the banking crises in advanced economies. According to their paper, NPLs responds almost 
instantaneously to economic fluctuations. A slight deep in GDP growth result in positive uptake 
in NPLs. The trend presented in the current study shows similar pertains in both economies. 
Certainly, our study supports the argument by Reinhart & Rogoff, (2010) in calling for NPLs 
to be adopted as a sensible marker for the onset of banking crises.  
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CHAPTER 5  
5.1 DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ESTIMATION 
The study begins the panel estimation by exploring the relationships between the variables. 
Table 5.1.1(a) and table 5.1.1(b) present the correlation matrices for advanced and emerging 
economies respectively. In both economies, the relationships among the variables are consistent 
with the existing literature. GDP growth and public debt (PUD) are negatively related with 
NPLs and BCB (Festic el al., 2011).This paper also observe positive relationships between 
NPLs, interest rates (INT), inflation (INF) and unemployment (UNR) (Nkusu, 2011). In line 
with Louzis et al., (2012) findings, our study also shows a positive relationship between SOD 
and NPLs. 
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A negative relationship between sovereign debt (SOD) and BCB is observed in our analysis. 
Festic et al., (2011) argues that the macroeconomic shocks of 2008 reduced cash flows and 
lengthened payback periods. This has contributed in increases in sovereign debt (SOD). Borio 
and Zhu (2012) recommend that banks should adjust their loan portfolios or capital buffers over 
the cycle to guard against the risk of sharper erosion. Equally important, these two papers 
further invited regulators to critical demand higher cushions during economic expansions. Such 
recommendation is viewed as future policy tool that should be executed to prevent bank 
failures. Our correlation results are in line with these papers. It appears  as if the more indebt 
the countries become (SOD), the higher is NPLs and the harder it is to institute the BCB. 
 
 
26 
 
 In light of the unknown relationships between exchange rates (EXR), volume of imports (IMP), 
volume of exports (EXP01) and both credit risk indicators (Gauthier et al., 2012 and Nkusi 
2011). The current study observes the following relationships. In advanced economies, the 
results shows that exchange rate (EXR) relates negatively with both BCB and NPLs. However, 
in emerging economies exchange rate (EXR) relates positively with NPLs but negative with 
BCB. According to Jacques, (2008), this behavior might be caused by investor’s perceptive and 
the direction of economy growth. Appreciation of domestic currency during economic crisis 
drives some  foreign investors out in search for other economies with competitive lesser 
currency value. This capital flight phenomenon slows the economy down and contributes in 
increases in NPLs. Due to extensive foreign investor participation in emerging markets. This 
scenario is plausible and explains the positive relationship between EXR and NPLs in our 
analysis. 
 
A negative relationship between volume of imports (IMP) and both credit risk indicators is 
observed in both economies. However, the volume of exports (EXP01) shows some discrepancy 
in the two economies. In advanced countries, the volume of exports (EXP01) is positively 
related to both credit risk indicators. However, in emerging countries the volume of exports 
(EXP01) is negatively related with both indicators. These relationships explain the structural 
nature of both economies. For example, most emerging countries lack diversity in their 
economies and relies mostly on exporting primary products to advanced economies. These 
exports contributes significantly in GDP growth and boost employment. Therefore, any shock 
in volume of exports result in shrinks in the GDP growth , employment prospect, and earnings 
in foreign currency. This contributes in increases in NPLs and the depletion of BCB. 
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The panel estimation follows a two-pronged approach aimed at identifying factors that                   
explain the sensitivity of both credit risk indicators. The second phase assessed the impulse        
simulation among the credit risk indicators from the interactions with macroeconomic                   
variables in a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) system. These two econometric approaches   
are complementary and are supported by Ashely & Tsang, (2014) and Nkusi, (2011). 
 
5.2 GMM panel estimation 
 
Table 5.1.2 and table 5.1.3 present the GMM estimation for NPLs and BCB in developed              
economies. The results show that NPLs are sensitive to GDP growth; unemployment (UNR),                 
sovereign debt (SOD), interest rate (INT) and public debt (PUD). This supports the evidence   
of Berge & Boye, (2007); Nkusu, (2011); Cifter et al., (2009) and Segoviano et al., (2006).              
Exchange  rate movements together with both volume of exports and imports are not                         
significant in  explaining the sensitivity of NPLs. 
 
In relation to the BCB, we find sovereign debt (SOD), unemployment (UNR) and interest rate 
(INT) as significant macroeconomic variables responsible for the sensitivity of the buffer in       
developed economies. GDP growth (GDP), exchange rate (EXR), public debt (PUD), volume 
of exports (EXP) and imports (IMP) have no significant influence in the region. 
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Table 5.1.2. GMM Parameter estimation for the sensitivity of NPLs in developed economies. 
     Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 1st lag 2nd lag 3rd  lag 
    
 
∆GDPt 
 
 -0.31*** 
 
 -0.18*** 
 
  
  (0.02) (0.02)  
    
    
∆UNRt   0.40***  0.23***  0.31*** 
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
    
∆SODt  0.07***  0.05*  
 (0.02) (0.03)  
    
    
 ∆INTt  0.31***  0.23***  0.21*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
    
    
∆PUDt    0.04*  0.02*  0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
    
∆NPLs  0.50***  0.20*  0.30* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
    
    
No of observation  126   
Sargan  test  (0.88)   
M2 (0.05)   
    
    
Coefficient estimates marked ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 %   respectively.  Standard error is given 
in brackets below each coefficient (). An omitted coefficient in the lag   structure reflects insignificant parameters. ∆EXPt,          
∆EXRt and ∆IMPt are omitted from the estimation     based on insignificance. The p-values of Sargan and M2 specification          
test are given in brackets. 
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Table 5.1.3 GMM Parameter estimation for the sensitivity of BCB in developed economies. 
     Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 1st lag 2nd lag 3rd  lag 
    
    
∆UNRt  -0.15***  -0.13*** 
 (0.02)  (0.01) 
    
    
∆SODt -0.04**   
 (0.02)   
    
    
 ∆INTt -0.15*** -0.10***  
 (0.03) (0.02)  
    
    
    
∆BCB  0.16***  0.06***  0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
    
    
No of observation  126   
Sargan  test  (0.78)   
M2 (0.02)   
    
    
Coefficient estimates marked ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively.     Standard error is given 
in brackets below each coefficient (). An omitted coefficient in the lag   structure reflects insignificant parameters. ∆EXPt,          
∆EXRt, ∆GDPt, ∆IMPt and ∆PUDt are omitted from the estimation based on insignificance.  The p-values of Sargan and M2     
specification test are given in    brackets. 
 
 
In emerging economies we observe that exchange rate (EXR) is the main variable driving              
the sensitivity of both NPLs and BCB (table 5.1.4 and table 5.1.5).But, like in the developed      
region, NPLs are still sensitive to GDP growth; unemployment (UNR), sovereign debt (SOD)   
and interest rate (INT). This further supports the evidence of Berge & Boye, (2007); Nkusu          
(2011); Cifter et al., (2009) and Segoviano et al., (2006). However, public debt (PUD) and                   
volume  of exports (EXP) are not significant in explaining the sensitivity of NPLs.  
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Table 5.1.4 GMM Parameter estimation for the sensitivity of NPLs in emerging economies. 
     Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 1st lag 2nd lag 3rd  lag 
    
 
∆GDPt 
 
 -0.11*** 
 
 -0.05*** 
 
  
  (0.02) (0.02)  
    
    
∆UNRt   0.10*  0.03***   
 (0.09) (0.01)  
    
    
ΔEXRt  0.34**   0.21*** 
 (0.01)  (0.03) 
    
    
∆SODt  0.06***  0.08**  0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
    
    
 ∆INTt  0.21***  0.26***  0.19*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
    
    
∆IMPt   -0.04**  -0.02** 
 (0.02)  (0.01) 
    
    
∆NPLs  0.44**  0.32***  0.31*** 
 (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) 
    
    
No of observation  138   
Sargan  test  (0.81)   
M2 (0.04)   
  
 
  
 
Coefficient estimates marked ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively.     Standard error is given 
in brackets below each coefficient (). An omitted coefficient in the lag structure reflects insignificant parameters. ∆PUDt and 
∆EXPt are omitted from the estimation based  on insignificance. The p-values of Sargan and M2 specification test are  given in 
brackets. 
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Table 5.1.5 GMM Parameter estimation for the sensitivity of BCB in emerging economies. 
     Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 1st lag 2nd lag 3rd  lag 
    
 
∆GDPt 
 
  0.21* 
 
 0.10*** 
 
 0.12** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
    
    
∆UNRt    -0.10*** -0.12*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
    
    
ΔEXRt -0.24**  -0.22*** 
 (0.11)  (0.03) 
    
    
∆SODt -0.04***   
 (0.01)   
    
    
 ∆INTt  -0.19***  -0.11*** 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
    
    
∆IMPt    0.22***  0.19***  
 (0.01) (0.01)  
    
    
∆BCB  0.42***  0.26*  0.31*** 
 (0.02) (0.12) (0.02) 
    
    
No of observation  138   
Sargan  test  (0.89)   
M2 (0.03)   
  
 
  
 
Coefficient estimates marked ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively.      Standard error is give
n in brackets below each coefficient (). An omitted coefficient in the lag   structure reflects insignificant parameters. ∆PUDt      
and ∆EXPt were omitted from the estimation based   on insignificance. The p-values of Sargan and M2 specification test are g
iven in brackets. 
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Regarding the BCB, we noticed that sovereign debt (SOD), unemployment (UNR)                            
and interest rate (INT) are macroeconomic variables responsible for the capitalisation of                
banks in emerging economies similar to the developed region. However, GDP growth,                    
exchange rate (EXR) and volume of imports (IMP) also plays a more prominent role.  This                     
finding unveils the unique nature of emerging market banks compared to their developed                 
counterparts (table 5.1.5). 
 
Since we are interested in the cumulative impact of each explanatory variable on the NPL and 
BCB , we also calculate the respective long-run coefficients, defined in equation 8.  
𝛽𝑙𝑅 = ∑ (𝛽)4𝐽=1 4j ⁄ (1- ɑ)                                                                                                        (8)      
This calculation of long run coefficients is also supported by Louzis et al.,(2012). It should be 
noted that the estimation of the long-run coefficient variance in equation (8) accounts for the     
covariance between the estimated parameters and providing accurate and robust statistical             
inference for the total effect of the four lagged coefficients. It is also evident that any                       
multicollinearity between the lags of the regressors resulting in misleading statistical                        
(in) significance is taken into account when we consider the long-run standard errors. The             
results for the Long-run coefficients are presented in table 5.1.10  and table 5.1.11                                
respectively. 
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5.3 GMM panel estimation robust tests  
We also tested the auto correlation in the GMM estimation for both NPLs and BCB in the              
two respective economic groups. Two diagnostics tests for autocorrelation (AR) in the first-      
differenced errors are conducted using the Arellano and Bond procedure. One should reject         
the null of zero on the first order serial correlation and not reject the absence of the null of           
zero in the second order serial correlation. The p-values associated with AR (1) and AR (2)         
indicates that these requirements are met in all GMM estimations. Therefore we accepted the 
GMM models as valid estimations. 
Table 5.1.6. Autocorrelation test for GMM estimations. 
  AR tests    P value 
 
AR (1) 
AR (2) 
 In table 5.1.2 
  
 
 
 
0.049*** 
0.012 
 
AR (1) 
AR (2) 
 
 
 In table 5.1.3 
  
 
 
 
0.041*** 
0.024 
   In table 5.1.4   
AR (1) 
AR (2) 
 
  
 
 
 In table 5.1.5 
 0.045*** 
0.014 
AR (1) 
AR (2) 
   0.047*** 
0.017 
    
                         Coefficient estimates marked *** denote significance at 1%. 
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To inform model specification, we further assess the level of integration of the explanatory          
variables. The Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests is utilised, which assume individual unit root     
processes across countries included in the panel. The Fisher-ADF test suggests that, all                  
variables are stationary in level, except for exchange rate and volume of exports. However,          
the null of a unit root was rejected after the first differencing. We then consider all variables      
in the estimation at difference stationary level based on the Fisher-ADF test in order to                 
maintain consistency. The different orders of integration of the variables point no                               
interference (table 5.1.7). Hence, we accepted the specifications of the GMM models.   
 
Table 5.1.7. Panel unit root tests. 
                              Fisher ADF                         Fisher PP 
   
     
NPL level   77.47*** NPL 1st dif  -2.53***  NPL level 71.37*** NPL 1st dif 132.4*** 
     
BCB level  71. 32*** BCB 1st dif -8.03**  BCB  level 70.11** BCB 1st dif 104*** 
     
GDP level  81.92 *** GDP 1st dif-1.48***  GDP level 73.54** GDP 1st dif 148.76** 
     
UNR level 58.49* UNR1st dif-0.48**  UNR level 54.49* UNR 1st dif 96.2* 
     
INT  level  116.81*** INT  1st dif -1.05**  INT  level 75.90*** INT   1st dif 90.62** 
     
IMP level  120.3*** IMP  1st dif -3.12**  IMP level 52.39*** IMP  1st  dif 73.12** 
     
SOD level  76.72** SOD 1stdif -8.71**  SOD level 75.72** SOD 1st dif  80.71** 
     
PUB level  53.64** PUB 1st dif -6.62**  PUB level 46.14* PUB 1st dif  64.62** 
     
EXR level  60.58 EXR 1st dif -8.64**  EXR level 79.58 EXR 1st dif 75.64** 
     
EXP level  47.9 EXP  1st dif -3.89**  EXP level 113.6 EXP  1st dif 110 
     
     
                    *, **, and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % respectively. 
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5.4 Panel VAR estimation 
On the second analysis, the paper models the impulse response of both credit risk indicators      
from the interactions with the macroeconomic variables observed from the GMM                             
estimations. An unrestricted VAR is utilised to uncover impulse simulations given by                     
equation (9). This model is supported by Nkusi, (2011): 
 
yit = B (L) y it + ᶓit ,                                                                                                                                                                             (9) 
 
yit is a k x 1 vector including NPLs or BCB and the macrofinancial variables of interest                   
discussed above, B(L) is a matrix in the lag operator; i =1,...,N is the cross-section indicator;      
t=1, ..., T is the time dimension; ᶓit and is a vector of disturbances assumed to have zero mean 
and covariance matrix ∑ᶓ. The dynamic interactions between credit risk indicators and                 
macroeconomic variables are uncovered from impulse response functions (IRFs) presented        
by equation 10: 
 
yt =  B (L)-1 ᶓt = ᶓt +∑ ɸ∞𝑗=1  j ᶓt-j                                                                                             (10) 
 
In our exercise, the impacts of macroeconomic variables on the other bank credit indicators        
are obtained by shocking the error term and tracing its marginal effects through all equations    
in the system. As an impulse in one variable is likely to be accompanied by an impulse in              
another variable, orthogonalized impulses are considered. They are obtained from equation         
(10) by choosing some matrix A such that AA=∑ᶓ. The unit covariance matrix are then                             
contemporaneously uncorrelated, allowing for the shocks to provide a more realistic                        
representation (Lütkepohl, 2008). 
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We also conducted cointegration tests on the panel VAR to ensure that inference is based on    
non-spurious relationships. The cointegration analysis is useful to the extent that the variables 
included in the VAR have different order of integration. The Johansen’s trace and Maximum   
eigenvalue tests clearly supports the existence of cointegrating relationships, with the number 
of cointegrating vectors ranging from 5 to 10 (Table 5.1.8). The findings of cointegration in       
the  system enable us to proceed with the examination of impulse interactions among                       
variables. 
 
 
  Table 5.1.8.Panel VAR-Johansen cointegration test. 
                                  Assumptions on   Integration Test  Specification  
 
No trend in data   
 
 
Test type : (no int, no trend) 
Trace                       10                                            
Max-eigenvalue      10 
  
                                
 
 
No trend in data  
 
Test type (int, no trend) 
10 
10 
 
Linear trend in data 
Test type : (no int, no trend) 
Trace                       9                   
Max-eigenvalue      10 
Quadratic trend in data 
Test type : (int and trend) 
Trace                       5                  
Max-eigenvalue      7 
 
 
  
  
Linear trend in data 
Test type (int, and trend) 
8 
9 
 
 
 
    
   
The figures in each column indicate the selected number of cointegration relations at the 5%                                                                                                                    
significance level. 
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Figure 3. Impulse response of NPLs in the developed economies. 
 
    
 
 
   
The x axis shows the number of years elapsed, where time zero is the year that the shock occurs.  Dashed lines denote 95 percent confidence band
s of the VAR impulse    response. 
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Figure 4. Impulse response of BCB in the developed economies. 
 
         
 
 
 
         
 
The x axis shows the number of years elapsed, where time zero is the year that the shock occurs.  Dashed lines denote 95 percent confidence band
s of the VAR impulse    response.  
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                       Table 5.1.9 Long-run coefficients for the determinants of credit risk indicators in developed economies. 
 
 NPLs BCB PUB EXP EXR GDP IMP INF INT SOD  
 
 
BCB 
PUB 
EXP 
 
          
 -0.29**          
 0.31***          
       0.42*     
EXR       0.13*      
GDP -0.17**      0.09*      
IMP 
INF 
       0.03* 0.11*  0.11*     
     0.11***         
INT  0.22*** -0.23***    0.16**   -0.34*    0.61*   
SOD 
UNR 
 0.05** -0.05**        -0.08*  0.02*  0.03**  
     0.44*** -0.07*** 0.20**    -0.19*  0.02* 0.02* 0.38** 
   
Coefficient estimates marked ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively.     
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During large capital inflows periods, non-sterilized interventions on the developed economies 
increase the monetary base (Kaminsky et al., 2005).Moreover, the favourable interest rate           
environment  have also foster easiness of banks to lend to the households due to good                      
employment conditions with better growth forecast. As such, household’s loans on                           
aggregate induce major risk on the banks’ balance sheets, resulting in unemployment and             
public debt to    drive mostly the upswings in the NPLs during bad economic times.  
 
We observe that a percentage point increase in NPLs is related to the 0.44 percentage rise in   
unemployment in a long run management of the capital buffer (table 5.1.9).The magnitude          
of this upswing caused a significant 0.29 % depletion   in BCB triggering a banking crisis as    
deposits runs dry.  This evidence is also supported by Nkusu (2011). Increases in interest rate, 
sovereign debt and public debt also  fuel the state of financial distress causing further losses in 
banks’ balance sheets (figure 3).  
 
Ideally, the bank capital buffer should be instrumental in dealing with the shortfalls as GDP      
output diminishes. But, Bikker & Metzemakers, (2005) reported a weak relationship between    
BCB and GDP growth as far back as 2005 in developed economies. The results in table 5.1.3  
and figure 3 support the view of these authors. However, we noticed that interest rate,                              
unemployment and sovereign debt give incentive for capitalisation of these banks in a                     
feedback loop mechanism as presented in the long run estimation (table 5.1.9) . Hence, a 1%   
increase in   buffer is associated with 0.23 % fall in interest rate as bank income experience       
a negative  shock. Unemployment and sovereign debt reinforces the income shock, due to             
rises in NPLs creating a need to rescue the banking  system.  
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Increasing the capital amount per individual loan granted by the banks is a genuine                           
endeavour as recommended by Basil III. But, the strategy of keeping these capital buffers               
counter cyclical   and responding almost instant from GDP growth shortfalls remains to be          
seen. The steep credit expansion to households, which occurred during this decade, also                
poses the question whether the quality of loans granted during this period was accurately               
evaluated by the banking system.  
 
Consequently, unemployment and public debt   should have not been the main drivers of the   
depletion in buffer as witnessed in figure 4. Ultimately, we  must accept that without                       
progressive counter cyclical policies in the capital buffer, the region might find itself in the        
same crisis zone with more severe consequences. Managing the credit   risk through the                 
unemployment channel is the most significant strategy for the stability of   the banking                         
system in the developed economies.
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                                                      Figure 5. Impulse response of NPLs in the emerging economies. 
 
 
 
The x axis shows the number of years elapsed, where time zero is the year that the shock occurs. Dashed lines denote 95 percent confidence band
s of the VAR impulse                        response. 
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Figure 6. Impulse response of BCB in the emerging economies. 
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                       Table 5.1.10. Long-run coefficients for the determinants of credit risk indicators in emerging economies. 
 
             
NPLs   BCB  PUB EXP  EXR  GDP     IMP   INF   INT SOD     
 
 
BCB 
PUB 
EXP 
           
             
 -0.22***              
                
               
EXR  0.38***  -0.27***   -0.01**          
GDP -0.17*  -0.10** -0.17**  0.08* -0.09**      -0.02*   
IMP 
INF  
-0.19***  -0.15**   0.13** -0.11*  0.43*                                             
     0.11**    0.29**    -0.06*      
INT  0.09***  -0.05***         0.41**      
SOD 
UNR 
 0.05***  -0.09**       -0.08*  -0.13**    0.03**   
    0.09**  -0.08**  0.21**    -0.19* -0.04**  0.12**  0.12* 0.31* 
   
 
                                   Coefficient estimates marked ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % respectively.    
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Credit expansion has improved significantly in banks of emerging economies.  Such                        
expansion has been biased nevertheless, targeting   mainly corporates than the general                    
households opposite to what we observed in developed economies. This is further supported    
by the Rey, (2013) showing an increase in loan-to-deposit ratios since the early 2000s                          
targeted at corporates. For that reason, public debt is not insignificant in explaining the                             
sensitivity of the aggregate NPLs in the emerging economies.  
The negative relationship between volume of   imports and   NPLs reflects the vulnerability       
of emerging economies from the dynamics of global finance.  For instance, majority of                  
countries in the region are importing goods needed for   extracting   raw materials.                            
Therefore,   any shock in the volume of imports compromises GDP growth in a long run and     
earnings in foreign currency, through the export channel. This contributes in increases of              
NPLs as presented in table 5.1.10. 
 Benes &  Kumho, (2015) points that foreign currency attraction was used in determining               
credit   expansion during the period of large inflows episodes prior the 2008 financial crisis.    
As a result, we find exchange rate to be the main variable responsible for the sensitivity of           
both credit risk indicators( NPLs and BCB) .One should be concerned with the rise of foreign  
liabilities ratios in  banks of emerging economies as hinted by Rey, (2013). As per our                      
analysis, a 4 % increase in NPLs is associated with shockings increases in foreign currency          
(figure 5). This situation    brings    liquidity risk as banks battle to finance imports                             
orientated activities. Inflation (INF) especially for imported goods starts rising up causing a        
slower GDP growth. This induces long term losses in the bank balance sheet as presented in      
table 5.1.10.. 
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Another channel responsible for the upswing in NPLs comes from investors who                                  
reconsider their investment portfolios; with “flight to quality” as a main objective when                 
foreign currency appreciate (Agosin & Huaita, 2010). Such capital outflow also puts pressure 
on banks as   investors’ opt out of emerging markets aiding a depletion of up to 0.6 % in BCB 
(figure 6). Rises in sovereign debt and unemployment reinforce the need to buffer   the banks   
due to low volume of imports coupled with low GDP growth (table 5.1.10).  
 
In future, the banks of the region may not be able to face their lending obligations when the        
cycle reverses because of exchange rate dynamics and foreign capital inflows. As the global     
economy struggle to recover, this may suggest a much longer deterioration in domestic                  
economies (Ghosh et al., 2014). In addition, banks are usually likely to seek for foreign                  
currency lending as foreign capital flows increase. This situation may further cause an                    
“indirect currency mismatch”, especially regarding domestic loans to households and small       
and medium-sized enterprises (Boudias 2015). Therefore, strategies to manage the exchange     
rate risk and  foreign capital movement remain necessary in maintaining the financial health     
of emerging  market banks. 
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CHAPTER 6  
 6.1 DISCUSSION 
In this study, we have used a dynamic panel data method to examine the sensitivity of both       
BCB and NPLs comparatively between advanced and emerging countries. Firstly, we assess     
the degree of sensitivity of NPLs to GDP growth incorporating the deep recession of 2008 and 
the positive economic performance witnessed in the last ten years (BIS, 2008b ). Our findings 
present a view that concurs with others papers in calling for NPLs to be equally used as a                
sensible marker for the onset of banking crisis. Equally important, the current investigation          
supports the use of both credit risk indicators (BCB and NPLs) in interrogating the financial       
health of banks.  
The study has also enhanced the theoretical models that regresses multiple macroeconomic          
variables with bank credit risk indicators. Thus, we have succeeded in providing a                             
macroeconomic framework that explains the sensitivity of credit risk indicators across                    
economies. The results shows that NPLs in advanced economies are sensitive to GDP growth, 
sovereign debt (SOD), unemployment rates (UNR), real lending rates (RLR) and public debt    
(PUD). However, unemployment rates (UNR) is the main economic variable exerting the            
greatest  impact in the sensitivity of NPLs. The same macroeconomic variables are responsible 
for the sensitivity of BCB. However, GDP growth exerts the strongest impact compared to the 
other macroeconomic variables.  
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Regarding emerging economies we find NPLs to be sensitive to exchange rates (EXR), GDP   
growth, volume of imports (IMP), real lending rates (RLR), sovereign debt (SOD), and                  
unemployment (UNR). However, exchange rate (EXR) is the main economic variable                    
responsible for positive upswing in the NPLs and the depletion of BCB. Other macroeconomic 
variables responsible for the sensitivity of BCB include unemployment (UNR), GDP growth,   
volume of imports (IMP), real lending rates (RLR) and sovereign debt (SOD).  
 
For now, it must be accepted   that the financial crisis presented a structural break down affect
ing the interrelations between NPLs, BCB differently in both advance and emerging                         
economies. Banks and regulators of these economies should monitor the modelled                           
macroeconomic variables separately, to   accurately understand the dynamics of the prevailing 
systematic risk and avert future financial instabilities. 
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CONCLUSION 
The relationships uncovered in this study have a direct link in forecasting and stress testing        
purposes to the regulatory authorities. The GMM coefficients and the impulse responses can     
assist in assessing the likely change in liquidity and whether such changes could pose risk                
of   financial instability. Policies and reforms should be geared towards avoiding sharper                
erosion of BCB though channels that set into motion the adverse increase in NPLs.                          
Unemployment in developed economies and exchange rate in emerging economies should be   
given special  attention when conceiving any policy mix to cope with credit expansion. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Our analysis is subjected to a number of limitations. First, NPLs is a rough measure of credit    
quality. A decrease in NPLs can simply reflect the removal of unrecoverable loans from the      
banks’ balance sheets. This might give a false interpretation about the liquidity risk of the              
bank. In   this regard, the flow of debt classified as nonperforming for the first time would be              
more informative. However, due to unavailability of such data we could not explore this angle 
of   analysis. 
 
Secondly, the relationships derived from aggregate NPL or BCB, while useful, can mask                
important differences in feedback between these variables and the macro economy. Cautions   
should be exercise when interpreting these relationships. Lastly, bad loans can make a                       
difference on banks’ ability to continue lending after economic shocks. In this regard, data            
permitting an analysis of the linkages after crisis could enrich the understanding of the                    
associated macrofinancial vulnerabilities.  
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